November 21, 2021 | View in Browser
Welcome to The Backstory. Every Sunday, we’ll guide you through the debates driving U.S. foreign policy and international affairs using pieces from the Foreign Affairs archives—some recent, some decades old. On October 25, two years into Sudan’s transition to democracy, General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan deposed the country’s civilian prime minister. The coup, coming just hours after the U.S. special envoy to the Horn of Africa asked Burhan not to interfere with the transition, was “a direct snub to the United States,” writes Alex de Waal. “Burhan’s power grab has further called into question U.S. influence in an already unstable neighborhood.”
Although his rebuke was stark, Burhan is only the latest Sudanese leader to frustrate the United States. Former President Omar al-Bashir, who seized power in 1989 and governed until 2019, alienated Washington by backing Saddam Hussein’s invasion of Kuwait in 1990, harboring prominent terrorists, and violently oppressing marginalized groups. In return, Washington imposed sanctions on Khartoum, cut off diplomatic relations, and began supporting the southern insurgents in Sudan’s civil war.
At the time, some analysts questioned the wisdom of these antagonistic policies. Although Washington may have hoped its strategy could prompt a southern victory, the U.S. government’s actions “did little to end the fighting,” Randolph Martin wrote in 2002. The United States could better help Sudan by offering economic relief to the government in exchange for improved behavior. “Khartoum has shown itself to be very interested in getting these sanctions lifted,” Martin said. “Progressive engagement by Washington should now supplant the old policy of isolation.”
The United States did engage with Sudan in the following years, helping broker a 2005 agreement that ended the civil war and paved the way for southern independence. But the potential for renewed violence remained. To prevent such an outcome, the United States would need to combine diplomacy with a threat of military force, former U.S. Special Envoy to Sudan Andrew Natsios argued in 2012. Absent clear redlines from Washington, “Khartoum may ignore all outside pressure” and escalate the conflict.
By the beginning of 2017, U.S.-Sudanese relations had again edged in a more accommodating direction. In the final weeks of the administration of President Barack Obama, Washington eased sanctions on the grounds that Khartoum had begun cooperating with the United States on counterterrorism, had curtailed its military, and was allowing in more humanitarian aid. Zach Vertin wrote that the move was wise. Decades of hostility had failed to curb the regime’s brutal conduct, and Obama’s tentative opening “marked a recognition that Washington stood a better chance to achieve its goals in Sudan through a smarter, more flexible diplomacy.” John Prendergast, meanwhile, argued that the decision was a mistake. “The strengthening of a violent and corrupt autocracy will only continue to devastate the country,” he contended.
In 2019, widespread grassroots protests achieved in weeks what U.S. pressure hadn’t in years: the fall of Bashir’s regime. In the aftermath, Washington supplied the transitional government with financial and technical support. But now that the military has taken control, de Waal says it is time for a return to sanctions. Money, he argues, is the best tool to force the generals to negotiate. “Without such engagement,” he writes, “Sudan risks losing all of the progress it has made.” 
Get a selection of the very best of Foreign Affairs book reviews. Delivered twice a month. Subscriber Resources: Please note that if you have a Print-only subscription, you will need to upgrade to All-Access or switch to Digital to use our app and other digital formats. The Backstory is a subscriber-only email. Was it forwarded to you? Subscribe here to receive it. © 2021 Council on Foreign Relations | 58 East 68 Street, New York NY | 10065 Reset your password here. |
